James Adkins | Europe and Eurasia Fellow
Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, with Maia Sandu, President of Moldova. Image sourced from Dati Bendo / European Union via Wikimedia Commons.
In October 2024, two pivotal elections took place in the former Soviet republics of Moldova and Georgia. While Moldovans voted narrowly in a referendum to move closer towards the European Union (EU), Georgians re-elected an increasingly pro-Russian government. These results will determine both countries’ geopolitical trajectories and shape the EU enlargement process in coming years. Although the outcomes differ, both votes were marred by allegations of Russian interference, including vote buying, disinformation and cyberattacks. The success of these influence operations has exposed the urgent need for the EU to be more proactive in countering Russia’s hybrid warfare and defending its strategic interests in its Eastern neighbourhood.
Moldova and Georgia are no strangers to Russian aggression. Russian troops have been present in Moldova’s breakaway Transnistria region since 1990, while one of the first warning signs of Putin’s revanchist ambitions came when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 – occupying 20 per cent of its territory. The ever-present threat of further Russian aggression has pushed both countries to seek EU and NATO membership. However, in recent years, pro-Russian parties have weaponised the war in Ukraine to spread fear that moving closer to the EU would provoke conflict with Russia – an argument deployed to great effect in the recent elections.
On 20 October in Moldova, voters narrowly approved a proposal to enshrine the principle of EU membership in the constitution, with 50.4 per cent in favour. The pro-European President, Maia Sandu, has accused Russia of an elaborate vote-buying scheme in which people were paid through proxies to vote no. These payments are likely to have had significant influence in a country whose economy has been hit hard by the war in Ukraine. Moldovans simultaneously voted in a Presidential election, in which Sandhu was re-elected in a run-off. Despite a slight dip in votes compared to the previous election, Sandhu’s popularity remained resilient in the face of incumbency pressures and Russia’s meddling. EU accession negotiations will now move forward; however, Sandu will face another major test when parliamentary elections are held next year.
On 27 October in Georgia, the ruling Georgia Dream (GD) party led by Kremlin-linked oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili claimed victory in parliamentary elections marred by claims of democratic backsliding. While the pro-European President and opposition have refused to recognise the results amid allegations of widespread fraud, some have speculated that GD could have won regardless due to the effectiveness of its fear-based campaign – which juxtaposed images of war-torn Ukraine with peaceful Georgian cities. In recent years, GD has shifted away from the West, taking a Russia-friendly stance on the war in Ukraine and passing Russia-style foreign agent and anti-LGBTQ legislation. After granting Georgia candidate status in 2023, the EU has now declared accession negotiations ‘de-facto halted’ in an report published after the elections.
The close result of the referendum in Moldova and the re-election of an increasingly pro-Russian government in Georgia serve as a massive wake-up call for the EU. The EU cannot treat enlargement as inevitable and must take a more strategic approach to accession negotiations with its neighbours. To achieve this, the EU must better utilise incentives to support pro-European forces, and deterrents to reduce the appeal of pro-Russian parties. In practice, this means moving forward with the gradual integration of accession candidates which show commitment to democratic processes and align themselves with EU values, like Moldova. The EU should provide candidates with a clear timeline to achieving membership which offers tangible benefits along the way, such as financial assistance in return for progress on the EU’s accession conditions.
At the same time, the EU must become more assertive in pushing back against pro-Russian and anti-democratic parties in accession candidate countries. While the EU had already frozen accession negotiations with Georgia, it should have made the consequences of re-electing a GD government clearer to ordinary voters. During the election campaign, the ruling party – acutely aware of Georgians’ strong pro-EU sentiment – claimed to support EU membership and utilised EU imagery on its posters. This gave Georgians the illusion that a vote for GD would not disrupt their EU aspirations. In future, the EU should provide a stronger public response to such deception by making clear the fundamental blockages which anti-democratic, pro-Russian parties pose to accession negotiations.
Finally, the EU must more forcefully counter Russian disinformation and better communicate the benefits of EU and NATO membership to ordinary citizens in accession candidate countries. Contrary to Russian disinformation, the NATO aspirations of countries like Moldova are not ‘dangerous’. On the contrary, NATO membership acts as a strong deterrent against Russian aggression – evidenced by the fact that Russia has not dared invade the Baltics. While Russia aggressively spreads disinformation through propaganda channels such as Russia Today, the EU must better promote its own message in the region. This could be achieved through the creation of an EU-funded media organisation in the mould of US-funded Radio Free Europe – especially given the risks posed by a Trump administration to such institutions.
The votes in Moldova and Georgia have shown that the EU’s eastward enlargement cannot be treated as inevitable, and requires proactive efforts to fight Russian interference and support democratic, pro-European forces. The re-election of Donald Trump only adds to the necessity for the EU to act more strategically and defend its critical interests in its own neighbourhood. While the war in Ukraine has highlighted the military challenge posed by Russia, the EU must also confront Russia’s hybrid threats against its Eastern neighbours to protect democracy and promote EU values.
James Adkins is the Europe and Eurasia Fellow for Young Australians in International Affairs. He recently completed a Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Modern Languages majoring in Political Science and International Relations, French Studies, and German Studies at the University of Western Australia.
During his fellowship, James looks forward to exploring contemporary geopolitical developments shaping Europe and the wider Eurasian region, including their implications for Australia and our region, the Indo-Pacific.
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